Politicians and Naval Strategy: On the ‘Sea Blindness’ of Statesmen 

Guest post written by Richard Harding and Guimerá Agustin, editors of Sailors, Statesmen and the Implementation of Naval Strategy.

This summer in the UK, matters of national security are assuming a higher profile than they have for many decades. After years of hybrid or ‘grey zone’ warfare, the scale of direct inter-state violence and sabre-rattling has escalated to send shock waves through the world’s capitals. In the light of events in the Ukraine, the Middle East, and the China Seas, nations are re-evaluating the potential for ‘hot war’ and what this might mean to domestic politics and their defence capabilities.  

The maritime dimension is critical to most nations. Over 90% of world trade by volume travels by sea and small disruptions in these supply lines have a disproportionate impact on national economic health. Far worse may happen from actual naval hostilities of blockade or bombardment. Getting naval defence right is a primary concern of political leadership. 

However, throughout history it has been a very difficult to achieve. Most politicians are unfamiliar with how navies work, but what they do know is that they are phenomenally expensive and investments take a long time to reach maturity. Much may happen to divert attention or change priorities between initiation and fulfilment of a project. In Britain this ‘sea blindness’ has been lamented for decades, without any clear way towards reducing or eliminating it.  

The essays we have collected in this book suggest that the British experience is neither unique nor modern. Indeed the anxiety related the interface between professional naval experts and political leaders was evident in the early eighteenth century and the authors of our essays have shown similar concerns in a range of countries over the centuries. They show that the relationships were highly variable, culturally conditioned, and heavy influenced by the immediate political environment.  

For example, the Spanish monarchy was generally more sensitive to its naval security than was Bourbon France. While economically and diplomatically weaker than France the Spanish monarchy oversaw the development of a powerful navy from very weak beginnings in 1713. Its navy made a major contribution to victory against Britain in the War of American Independence and, as a result, in 1783, the Spanish empire stood at its apogee in terms of size. It also had found a combination of political and naval leaders in the Count of Floridablanca and Admiral Valdés, who could work together to interpret the needs of the empire and navy, establishing the Junta Estado to construct mutually reinforcing policy. It did not last long as the cataclysmic events of the French Revolution and the subsequent wars, consumed the Spanish state.  

The high point of development of the Spanish navy (1783-1792) could not prevent the disasters that followed from events in Europe. However, the example illustrates what could be done when naval experts and political leaders understood each other. In Britain this understanding was more deeply institutionalised. However it was never impervious to change and by 1918 that understanding was fading. In France it seldom if ever became solidly established. In the United States the development of naval/political understanding was slow and faltering, but now has a depth that is embedded in the US political and educational systems.  As the world changes this may not be enough. The maritime environment remains critical to political and economic health, and all societies need to continue to think about how their naval and political expertise can be brought together to sustain an effective naval presence in a challenging environment.  


RICHARD HARDING is emeritus professor at the University of Westminster and AGUSTÍN GUIMERÁ is a researcher at the Instituto de Historia, Consejo Supeior de Investigaciones Cientificas, Madrid. Their edited collection Sailors, Statesmen and the Implementation of Naval Strategy is out now. 


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